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When Are the People Ready? 
 The Interplay Between Facial 
Sufficiency and Readiness Under 
CPL Section 30.30 
 
John H. Wilson* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
If you practice criminal law, you have heard these words: 
“The People are filing a supporting deposition, and stating 
ready.” For the most part, these terms of art are translated as 
follows: “By filing this document with the Court, which is a 
statement signed by a witness to the events alleged in the 
Criminal Court complaint, and serving it on the defense, the 
People have cured the hearsay present in said complaint.  The 
complaint is now a Criminal Court information, and the Court 
now has full jurisdiction over this matter.  The People now also 
state ready for trial, meaning, the time limitations of CPL 
section 30.30 have stopped accruing, and there is no longer any 
jurisdictional impediment to proceeding to trial.” 
Most likely, you have also either heard, or said these words, 
as well: “Judge, the People cannot be ready since the complaint 
is facially insufficient.”  This translates as follows, “Even if the 
hearsay has been cured from the complaint, there are other 
reasons this complaint is jurisdictionally defective.  As a result 
of these defects, the People cannot proceed to trial, and their 
time continues to run under CPL section 30.30.” 
But do these concepts all follow one after the other in logical 
order?  Does conversion of the complaint to an information, that 
is, curing the hearsay contained in said complaint, mean that 
 
* John H. Wilson served as a judge in Criminal Court in both Brooklyn and the 
Bronx between 2005 and 2014.  A former prosecutor and defense attorney, he 
is the author of New York Search and Seizure Case Law Guide.  See JOHN H. 
WILSON, NEW YORK SEARCH AND SEIZURE CASE LAW GUIDE (2014). 
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the People are now ready for trial and that there is no longer any 
impediment to the commencement of trial?  What is the impact 
of a facially insufficient complaint on New York Criminal 
Procedure Law (“CPL”) section 30.30 calculations? 
In this article, we will explore these intersecting concepts of 
conversion, facial sufficiency, and readiness.  As we shall see, 
readiness for trial does not necessarily follow from the 
conversion of a complaint - and dismissal on CPL section 30.30 
grounds does not necessarily follow from a finding of facial 
insufficiency. 
 
II. Time Limitations for Prosecution of a Criminal Action 
Under CPL Section 30.30 
 
Unlike the statute of limitations, which controls the time 
within which a criminal action may be commenced, CPL section 
30.30 enumerates the time limitations for the prosecution of all 
criminal matters after commencement of the action.  Subdivision 
(1)(a) provides for six months to prosecute a felony;1 (1)(b) 
provides for 90 days for Class A misdemeanors (“punishable by 
a sentence of imprisonment of more than three months”);2 under 
(1)(c), the People have 60 days to prosecute Class B 
misdemeanors (“not more than three months”);3 and (1)(d) 
provides for a 30 days limitations period for the prosecution of 
violations.4 
The time periods stated in CPL section 30.30 “are generally 
calculated based on the most serious offense charged in the 
accusatory instrument and are measured from the date of 
commencement of the criminal action.”5 
A criminal action “commences” with the filing of the 
accusatory instrument with a local criminal court.6 This is 
almost always the same day as a defendant’s arraignment; 
however, in cases where a defendant has been given a Desk 
Appearance Ticket (“DAT”), “the criminal action must be 
 
       1.  N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.30(1)(a) (McKinney 2006). 
       2.  Id. § 30.30(1)(b). 
       3.  Id. § 30.30(1)(c). 
       4.  Id. § 30.30(1)(d). 
5. People v. Cooper, 779 N.E.2d 1006, 1007 (N.Y. 2002). 
6. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.05 (McKinney 2009). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/5
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deemed to have commenced on the date the defendant first 
appears in a local criminal court in response to the ticket.”7  If 
the defendant appears, but the accusatory instrument has not 
yet been filed with the court, in this instance, the People are 
charged with the time between the defendant’s initial 
appearance, and the filing of the accusatory instrument.8  The 
actual day of filing of the accusatory instrument is not included 
in CPL section 30.30 calculations.9 
 
III. What Constitutes Readiness for Trial? 
 
When the People state “ready” for trial, they must have 
removed all legal impediments to the commencement of their 
case.  In other words, the People are ready to proceed when they 
have “done all that is required of them to bring the case to a 
point where it may be tried.”10 
A statement of readiness pertains only to the People’s 
readiness to begin trial.  Stating “ready” for pre-trial hearings is 
not a statement of readiness.11 
There is also no such thing as “ready” for conversion, a 
fallacious concept discussed fully in People v. Khachiyan.12  
There, the Criminal Court of Kings County noted that the People 
“use the word ‘ready’ in a myriad of situations not contemplated 
by CPL § 30.30 . . . .”13 
As the Khachiyan Court stated, “the case law makes it quite 
clear that ‘ready for trial’ means only ‘ready for trial.’”14 
 
7. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.30(5)(b) (McKinney 2009). 
8. See People v. Stirrup, 694 N.E.2d 434, 438-39 (N.Y. 1998) 
9. See generally People v. Stiles, 514 N.E.2d 1368 (N.Y. 1987); People v. 
Eckert, 458 N.Y.S.2d 494 (Crim. Ct. 1983). 
10. See People v. England, 636 N.E.2d 1387, 1389 (N.Y. 1994) (citing 
People v. McKenna, 555 N.E.2d 911, 913 (N.Y. 1990)).  See generally People v. 
Dauphin, 976 N.Y.S.2d 465 (App. Div. 2013); People v. Brewer, 880 N.Y.S.2d 
56 (App. Div. 2009); People v. Khachiyan, 752 N.Y.S.2d 243 (Crim. Ct. 2002). 
11. See People v. Chavis, 695 N.E.2d 1110 (N.Y. 1998). 
12. Khachiyan, 752 N.Y.S.2d at 245-46. 
13. Id. at 245. 
14. Id. at 246 (citing People v. Clinton, 578 N.Y.S.2d 808, 814 n.4 (Crim. 
Ct. 1991) (emphasis added)) (“Unfortunately, the People tend to file 
corroborating affidavits and announce ready as if readiness and conversion 
were one and the same concept.”). 
3
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In People v. Kendzia,15 the Court of Appeals defined a proper 
statement of readiness: “there must be a communication of 
readiness by the People which appears on the trial court’s record. 
This requires either a statement of readiness by the prosecutor 
in open court . . . or a written notice of readiness sent by the 
prosecutor to both defense counsel and the appropriate court 
clerk, to be placed in the original record.”16 
For a statement of readiness to be valid, the People must be 
ready to commence trial at the time the statement is made. 
“[T]he prosecutor must make [the] statement of readiness when 
the People are in fact ready to proceed.”17  A statement of 
readiness is not “a prediction or expectation of future 
readiness.”18 
In People v. Sibblies,19 the Court of Appeals invalidated an 
off-calendar statement of readiness, leading to the dismissal of 
a misdemeanor information. Ms. Sibblies was initially arrested 
for felony assault on a police officer after a traffic stop.  On 
February 8, 2007, the People reduced the charge against Ms. 
Sibblies to a misdemeanor assault.  Then, “on February 22, 2007, 
the People filed an off-calendar certificate of readiness and a 
supporting deposition. Eight days later, on March 2, 2007, the 
People requested the medical records of the officer injured in the 
altercation.”20  On the next scheduled court appearance date of 
March 28, 2007, the People stated not ready since they were 
“continuing to investigate and are awaiting medical records (of 
the officer).”21 
Justice Jonathan Lippman held that once the People 
declared “not ready” in court after stating ready off calendar, the 
provisions of CPL Section 30.30(3)(b) apply; that is, the People’s 
“present unreadiness is due to some exceptional fact or 
 
15. 476 N.E.2d 287 (N.Y. 1985). 
16. Id. at 289; see People v. Wilson, 655 N.E.2d 168 (N.Y. 1995); People v. 
Bonilla, 942 N.Y.S.2d 509 (App. Div. 2012); People v. Mahmood, 824 N.Y.S.2d 
757 (Crim. Ct. 2006). 
13.  Kendzia, 476 N.E.2d at 290.  
18. Id.  See generally People v. Nunez, 851 N.Y.S.2d 128, 129 (App. Div. 
2008) ("[T]he record supports the motion court’s finding that the [People’s] 
request . . . was merely an illusory expectation of future readiness."). 
19. 8 N.E.3d 852 (N.Y. 2014). 
20. Id. at 853. 
21. Id. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/5
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circumstance.”22  The statute cites the example of “the sudden 
unavailability of evidence material to the People’s case.”23 
Following this rule, Justice Lippman stated that the trial 
court “may hold a hearing on the issue [but i]f the People cannot 
demonstrate an exceptional fact or circumstance, then the 
People should be considered not to have been ready when they 
filed the off-calendar certificate.”24 
Justice Lippman’s rationale for his holding will resonate 
with all practitioners of criminal law; “allowing, without 
scrutiny, declarations of readiness off-calendar and subsequent 
declarations of unreadiness at the next appearance creates the 
possibility that this scenario could be reenacted ad seriatim.”25 
Justice Victoria Graffeo’s concurrence was decided on “a 
narrower basis than the one proposed by Chief Justice 
Lippman.”26  Citing to People v. Kendzia,27 Judge Graffeo 
reiterated the Court of Appeals’ definition for a proper statement 
of readiness: first, “there must be a communication of readiness 
by the People which appears on the trial court’s record. This 
requires either a statement of readiness by the prosecutor in 
open court . . . or a written notice of readiness sent by the 
prosecutor to both defense counsel and the appropriate court 
clerk, to be placed in the original record. . . .”28 
For the purpose of the concurrence in Sibblies, Justice 
Graffeo concentrated on the second requirement for readiness: 
“the People ‘must in fact be ready to proceed at the time they 
declare readiness.’”29 
Rather than require a hearing on whether or not there was 
an “exceptional fact or circumstance” to explain the People’s 
 
       22.  N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.30(3)(b).  
23. Sibblies, 8 N.E.3d at 854-55 (citing N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 
30.30(3)(b)). 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. 64 N.Y.2d 331(1985). 
28. Sibblies, 8 N.E.3d at 857 (citing People v. Kendzia, 476 N.E.2d 287, 
290 (N.Y. 1985)); see People v. Wilson, 655 N.E.2d 168, 168 (N.Y. 1995); People 
v. Bonilla, 942 N.Y.S.2d 509 (App. Div. 2012): People v. Mahmood, 824 
N.Y.S.2d 757 (Crim. Ct. 2006). 
29. Sibblies, 8 N.E.3d at 856 (quoting People v. Chavis, 695 N.E.2d 1110, 
1112 (N.Y. 1998)). 
5
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subsequent non-readiness, Justice Graffeo believed that when 
“the prosecutor gave no explanation for the change in 
circumstances between the initial statement of readiness and 
the subsequent admission that the People were not ready to 
proceed without the medical records . . . [t]he February 22 
statement of readiness therefore did not accurately reflect the 
People’s position.”30 
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Graffeo cited to People 
v. Bonilla,31 where the First Department held that the People’s 
statement of readiness was illusory when the People “answered 
ready for trial but later requested two adjournments so that they 
could further investigate the case.”32 
Given the narrow basis for Justice Graffeo’s concurrence, 
her opinion is the one being followed.33  However, the Sibblies 
opinion highlights a fundamental issue that will be discussed in 
more detail below; that is, when the People announce readiness, 
it is necessary for the People to actually be ready for trial. 
 
IV. Facial Sufficiency as a Jurisdictional Prerequisite 
 
Under CPL section 100.10, there are several forms of local 
criminal court accusatory instruments.34  The ones to be 
addressed here are misdemeanor complaints and informations. 
CPL section 100.10(4) defines a “misdemeanor complaint” 
as “a verified written accusation by a person, filed with a local 
criminal court, charging one or more other persons with the 
commission of one or more offenses . . . it serves as a basis for 
the commencement of a criminal action, but it may serve as a 
basis for prosecution thereof only when a defendant has waived 
prosecution by information. . . .”35 
Under CPL section 100.10(1), an information “is a verified 
 
30. Id. at 856-57. 
31. 942 N.Y.S.2d 509 (App. Div. 2012). 
32. Sibblies, 8 N.E.3d at 856. 
33. See People v. McLeod, 988 N.Y.S.2d 436, 439 (Crim. Ct. 2014) (citing 
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)) ("[T]he holding of the Court 
may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the 
judgments on the narrowest grounds."). 
34. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.10 (McKinney 2009). 
35. Id. § 100.10(4). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/5
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written accusation by a person, filed with a local criminal court, 
charging one or more other persons with the commission of one 
or more offenses . . . it may serve as a basis both for the 
commencement of a criminal action and for the prosecution 
thereof in a local criminal court.”36 
Further, under CPL section 100.15(1), “an information [and] 
a misdemeanor complaint . . . must be subscribed and verified 
by a person known as the ‘complainant.’”  That person “may be 
any person having knowledge, whether personal or upon 
information and belief, of the commission of the offense or 
offenses charged.”37 
While both documents may serve as a basis for the 
commencement of a criminal action, there is a fundamental 
difference between a complaint and an information.  A complaint 
may serve as a “basis for prosecution” only when a defendant 
waives prosecution by information.  No such waiver is necessary 
when the instrument is an information. 
Thus, the local criminal court’s jurisdiction over a 
misdemeanor complaint is limited, compared to its jurisdiction 
over an information.  Moreover, there is no reference whatsoever 
to CPL section 30.30 and its time limitations in any of these 
statutes conferring jurisdiction to the criminal court over 
misdemeanor complaints and informations. 
 
V. Necessity for Conversion of Misdemeanor Complaints 
 
As discussed above, to convert a misdemeanor complaint to 
an information, the hearsay allegations must be “cured.”  This 
procedure is based upon CPL section 100.40(1), which states 
that “(a)n information, or a count thereof, is sufficient on its face 
when . . . (c) Non-hearsay allegations of the factual part of the 
information and/or of any supporting deposition establish, if 
true, every element of the offense charged and the defendant’s 
commission thereof.”38 
This requirement for non-hearsay allegations is also 
referenced in CPL section 100.15(3): “Nothing contained in this 
 
36. Id. § 100.10(1). 
37. Id. § 100.15(1). 
38. Id. § 100.40(1) (emphasis added). 
7
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section . . . limits or affects the requirement, prescribed in 
subdivision one of section 100.40, that in order for an 
information or a count thereof to be sufficient on its face, every 
element of the offense charged and the defendant’s commission 
thereof must be supported by non-hearsay allegations of such 
information and/or any supporting depositions.”39 
In People v. Dumas,40 the Court of Appeals stated that “the 
factual part of a misdemeanor complaint must allege ‘facts of an 
evidentiary character’ demonstrating ‘reasonable cause’ to 
believe that the defendant committed the crime charged.”41 
However, these facts can be of a hearsay nature, since “the 
misdemeanor complaint is designed to provide the court with 
sufficient facts for the court to determine whether the defendant 
should be held for further action.”42 For that “further action” to 
occur, however, the misdemeanor complaint must be converted 
into an information. 
On this basis, then, there is rarely any controversy in 
applying the time limitations of CPL section 30.30 to a 
misdemeanor complaint; that is, one in which the hearsay has 
not been cured. Thus, if the People fail to file the supporting 
deposition of a complaining witness, the complaint is routinely 
dismissed on 30.30 grounds.43 
Of course, there are some exceptions to this general rule.  In 
People v. Casey,44 the Court of Appeals stated that the “non-
hearsay requirement is met so long as the allegation would be 
admissible under some hearsay rule exception.”45  Thus, in 
People v. Valentine,46 a complaint containing uncorroborated 
statements by the complainant was sufficient, since the 
statements were “excited utterances, which are exceptions to the 
hearsay rule and thus admissible.”47 
In some instances, the People have relied upon the business 
 
39. Id. § 100.40 (emphasis added). 
40. 497 N.E.2d 686 (N.Y. 1986). 
41. Id. at 686-87. 
42. Id. (citing N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 100.15(3), 100.40(4)(b) (McKinney 
2009)). 
43. See People v. Gannaway, 728 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Crim. Ct. 2000). 
44. 740 N.E.2d 233 (N.Y. 2000). 
45. Id. at 236. 
46. 969 N.Y.S.2d 718 (App. Term 2013). 
47. See generally id. (citing Casey, 740 N.E.2d at 236). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/5
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records exception to the hearsay rule, and provided the 
supporting deposition of a person who states they have reviewed 
the records in question.  Some courts have held that the People 
must produce the records for the exception to apply, on the 
theory that such an assertion by a deponent is “double 
hearsay.”48  Others have held that production of the records is 
not necessary. 
In People v. Wilson,49 the court’s basis for its disagreement 
with the Ross and Tisdale courts is based upon Casey and People 
v. Kalin,50 where the Court of Appeals held that “so long as the 
factual allegations of an information give an accused notice 
sufficient to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to 
prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense, 
[these allegations] should be given a fair and not overly 
restrictive or technical reading.”51 
The Wilson court relied also upon Casey’s discussion of “the 
requirement for presentation of documents at pretrial to 
overcome hearsay issues.52  Casey held that ‘a non-hearsay 
requirement is met so long as the allegation would be admissible 
under some hearsay rule objection.’”53 
Under this theory, if the documents could potentially fit 
under the hearsay exception for business records, there would 
be no need for the court to review said documents before deeming 
a complaint an information that references the complainant’s 
review of such records.54 
 
48. See generally People v. Tisdale, 859 N.Y.S.2d 898 (Crim. Ct. 2008); 
People v. Ross, 814 N.Y.S.2d 861 (Crim. Ct. 2006). 
49. 899 N.Y.S.2d 582 (Crim. Ct. 2010). 
50. 906 N.E.2d 381 (N.Y. 2009). 
51.  Id. at 384 (citing People v. Konieczny, 813 N.E.2d 626, 630 (N.Y. 2004) 
(quoting Casey, 740 N.E.2d at 236)).  See generally People v. Jennings, 946 
N.Y.S.2d 68 (App. Term 2011); People v. Mack, 920 N.Y.S.2d 243 (App. Term 
2010). 
52. Wilson, 899 N.Y.S.2d at 585. 
53. Id. (citing Casey, 740 N.E.2d at 236). 
54. It should be noted that the Wilson court’s view, that it is unnecessary 
for the court to review the business records upon which the deponent relies in 
verifying a misdemeanor complaint, is inconsistent with the procedure 
conducted by the court in cases where a child is called upon to verify the 
charges stated in a misdemeanor complaint.  Before the court accepts the 
People’s assertions regarding the child’s capacity to swear to the facts 
contained in a complaint, the court either conducts its own voir dire of the 
child, or reviews the transcript of the People’s voir dire of the child, pursuant 
9
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In further support of its position, the Wilson court noted 
that “the Court of Appeals has increasingly taken [this] 
position,” as well as the Appellate Term, Second Department.55 
The Wilson court’s position is consistent with the standard 
for a facially sufficient information stated in Casey and Kalin.  If 
the non-hearsay facts stated in an information establish each 
and every element of the offense charged, as well as the 
defendant’s commission of said crime, then the information 
states a prima facie case, and is facially sufficient.56 
Echoing Dumas, however, the Kalin court did warn that 
“standing alone, a conclusory statement. . . does not meet the 
reasonable cause requirement.”57 
Since both Dumas and Kalin involved an officer’s ability to 
identify drugs, the factual allegations stated in the complaint 
must “provide[s] some information as to why the officer 
concluded that the substance was a particular type of illegal 
drug.”58 
 
VI. Post - Conversion Readiness 
 
Conversion of the misdemeanor complaint gives rise to an 
important issue - once the People have converted the 
misdemeanor complaint to an information, can they now state 
“ready”? The answer depends on whether or not they really are 
ready for trial. 
As stated above, for the People to be “ready” for trial, they 
must have removed all legal impediments to the commencement 
of their case; that is, they have “done all that is required of them 
 
to CPL section 60.20(2).  N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.20(2) (McKinney 2009).  
See generally People v. Richard, 929 N.Y.S.2d 723 (Crim. Ct. 2011); People v. 
Soler, 544 N.Y.S.2d 287 (Crim. Ct. 1989).  This procedure is conducted to fulfill 
the Court’s duty to insure that the infant complainant actually has the capacity 
and intelligence to understand the nature of an oath.  See People v. Lashaway, 
978 N.Y.S.2d 388 (App. Div. 2013).  Following the same principle, then, the 
court should review the business records used by a deponent to insure that said 
records actually support the charges. 
55. Wilson, 899 N.Y.S.2d at 585; see People v. Mayes, 858 N.Y.S.2d 856 
(App. Div. 2008). 
56. Wilson, 899 N.Y.S.2d at 583. See generally People v. Alejandro, 511 
N.E.2d 71 (N.Y. 1987). 
57.  People v. Kalin, 906 N.E.2d 381, 383 (N.Y. 2009). 
58. See id. at 385. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/5
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to bring the case to a point where it may be tried.”59 
Often, the People make their announcement of readiness at 
the time they cure the hearsay from a misdemeanor complaint. 
For instance, relying upon Kalin, the People often state ready in 
drug possession cases in the absence of a laboratory report.60 
While it is true that Kalin states “so long as the factual 
allegations of an information give an accused notice sufficient to 
prepare a defense . . . [these allegations] should be given a fair 
and not overly restrictive or technical reading,”61 nothing in this 
holding addresses whether a sufficient complaint means that the 
People have done all that is necessary to bring the case to a point 
where it may be tried. 
In fact, two recent cases decided by the author of this article 
illustrate the difference between conversion and readiness. 
In People v. Colon,62 the People filed a statement of 
readiness with a supporting deposition, thus converting the 
misdemeanor complaint into an information.63  However, the 
court asked the People how they could proceed to trial without a 
laboratory analysis.  The People stated that they were ready, 
“pursuant to Kalin.”64 
As it happened, once the laboratory report was produced, it 
was dated several days after the People’s statement of readiness. 
In that circumstance, the court held it impossible for the People 
to have been actually ready when they announced ready for trial: 
 
If one of the necessary elements of the People’s 
case is proof that the substance recovered from 
this Defendant is marijuana, and that substance 
was not analyzed until October 7, 2013, then the 
Statement of Readiness filed and served on 
September 27, 2013 is illusory, nothing more than 
 
59. See People v. England, 636 N.E.2d 1387, 1389 (N.Y. 1994). 
60. For a discussion of the procedural due process considerations 
regarding the court’s acceptance of a statement of readiness in the absence of 
a laboratory report, see People v. Nunn, 882 N.Y.S.2d 887 (Crim. Ct. 2009). 
61. 906 N.E.2d at 384. 
62. 990 N.Y.S.2d 438 (Crim. Ct. 2014). 
63. See generally id. 
64. Id. at 438. 
11
  
1010 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  35:3 
a prediction or expectation of future readiness.65 
 
Following this reasoning, in People v. Beckett,66 the author 
found another statement of readiness made by the People to be 
illusory.  In Beckett, the People stated ready at the arraignment 
of the defendant, despite the fact that the laboratory analysis of 
the drugs recovered in defendant’s apartment was not available 
until five days after the defendant’s arraignment.67  Thus, the 
statement of readiness was “an illusory statement of future 
readiness.”68 
Beckett makes explicit the point made in Colon - that is, the 
reliance upon Kalin for a statement of readiness is misplaced. 
“There is nothing in the Kalin decision that allows the People to 
equate conversion of the complaint to an information with 
readiness for trial.”69 
 
VII. Standards for Facial Sufficiency of Informations 
 
So far, we have discussed the application of CPL section 
30.30 to misdemeanor complaints; that is, an accusatory 
instrument which contains hearsay. In such an accusatory 
instrument, facial sufficiency is a secondary issue to conversion, 
since there is rarely, if ever, any debate that CPL section 30.30 
time limitations are not applicable.70 
In turning to a consideration of facial sufficiency of 
informations, that is, an accusatory instrument upon which a 
misdemeanor trial may commence, we must remember that the 
rules stated here apply equally to misdemeanor complaints. 
However, the issue of facial sufficiency is more often addressed 
after the misdemeanor complaint has been converted, or deemed 
to be an information. 
 
65. Id.; see People v. Kendzia, 476 N.E.2d 287, 290 (N.Y. 1985) (holding 
that a statement of readiness is not "a prediction or expectation of future 
readiness."). 
66. 987 N.Y.S.2d 576 (Crim. Ct. 2014). 
67. Id. at 579. 
68. Id. at 579 (citing Colon, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 438 (citing People v. Nunez, 
851 N.Y.S.2d 128, 129 (App. Div. 2008))). 
69. Id. at 580. 
70. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.05 (McKinney 2009). 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/5
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The necessity for an information to be facially sufficient is 
cogently discussed in People v. Camacho.71  There, the court 
noted that when an information is found to be facially 
insufficient, curing the defect “is imperative, because . . . the 
court’s jurisdiction is no longer assured.”72 
There are many ways in which an information can be 
deemed facially insufficient.  If the instrument states an 
incorrect date of occurrence, for instance, the document is void 
and fatally defective.73  If the location stated in the complaint is 
wrong, the document is also facially deficient.74  Since these 
defects appear on the face of the information, they are 
considered “facial” deficiencies. 
Under CPL section 170.30(1), “after arraignment upon an 
information . . . or a misdemeanor complaint, the local criminal 
court may, upon motion of the defendant, dismiss such 
instrument or any count thereof upon the ground that: (a) It is 
defective within the meaning of Section 170.35.”75  CPL section 
170.35(1) further states that “an information . . . or a 
misdemeanor complaint, or a count thereof, is defective within 
the meaning of paragraph (a) of subdivision one of section 170.35 
when: (a) It is not sufficient on its face pursuant to the 
requirements of section 100.40.”76 
On a review of the facial sufficiency of a criminal court 
information, the court’s review is limited to whether or not the 
People’s allegations as stated in the information are, in fact, 
sufficient.  This means that the facts alleged need only establish 
the existence of a prima facie case, even if those facts would not 
be legally sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.77 
As was stated in People v. Prevete,78 “accusatory instruments are 
to be accorded ‘a fair and not overly restrictive or technical 
reading’ and will be upheld so long as they serve the 
 
71. 711 N.Y.S.2d 283 (Crim. Ct. 2000). 
72. Id. at 288 (citations omitted). 
73. See generally People v. Easton, 121 N.E.2d 357 (N.Y. 1954) (citations 
omitted); People v. Schweizer, 289 N.Y.S. 964 (Crim. Ct. 1936). 
74. See People v. Idema, 518 N.Y.S.2d 292, 298 (Just. Ct. 1987). 
75. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.30(1) (McKinney 2009). 
76. Id. § 170.35(1). 
77. See People v. Jennings, 504 N.E.2d 1079, 1084 (N.Y. 1986). 
78. 809 N.Y.S.2d 777 (App. Term 2005). 
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fundamental purposes of providing the accused ‘notice sufficient 
to prepare a defense’ and in a form sufficiently ‘detailed’ to 
prevent a subsequent retrial for the same offense.”79 
Any discussion of the facial sufficiency of an information 
leads to an issue of intense debate; if the information is facially 
insufficient, the theory goes, then the People could never have 
been ready for trial.  If they were never ready for trial, then 
shouldn’t the accusatory instrument be dismissed pursuant to 
CPL section 30.30? 
 
VIII. Application of CPL Section 30.30 to Facially Insufficient 
Informations 
 
The “conventional wisdom” here was stated in the case of 
People v. Colon.80  There, the prosecution cannot proceed to trial 
on a facially insufficient misdemeanor complaint since the 
“Criminal Court clearly has no jurisdiction to take to trial a 
defendant who is charged only by a complaint and who has not 
waived the filing of a sufficient information.”81  This view is 
premised on the holding in People v. Case;82 “[a] valid and 
sufficient accusatory instrument is a nonwaivable jurisdictional 
prerequisite to a criminal prosecution.”83 
In Colon, the defendant returned after bench warrants were 
issued for his arrest in several unconverted matters - that is, the 
accusatory instruments were all misdemeanor complaints 
containing uncured hearsay allegations.84  Defendant moved to 
dismiss all matters, asserting that the People’s time to prosecute 
these matters had expired, pursuant to CPL section 30.30.85  The 
motion was granted by the trial court, which was reversed by the 
Appellate Term, who in turn, was reversed by the Court of 
Appeals for reasons stated in the opinion of the Criminal 
Court.86 
 
79. Id. at 778 (citations omitted). 
80. 443 N.Y.S.2d 305 (Crim. Ct. 1981). 
81. Id. at 307. 
82. 365 N.E.2d 872 (N.Y. 1997). 
83. Id. at 873. 
84. See Colon, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 307-08. 
85. Id. at 306. 
86. See People v. Colon, 453 N.E.2d 548, 548 (N.Y. 1983). 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/5
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This aspect of the Colon holding was superseded when the 
New York State legislature amended CPL section 30.30(4)(c) to 
exclude the time during which a defendant is absent from court 
while a bench warrant is pending.87  However, the amendment 
only affected whether or not the People were required to cure the 
hearsay from an unconverted complaint while a defendant was 
absent, and a bench warrant was outstanding.  The underlying 
concept remains the view taken by the majority of criminal 
defense attorneys - if the misdemeanor complaint, or 
information, is facially insufficient, then the court is without 
jurisdiction to try the case, and the People cannot be ready for 
trial.  CPL section 30.30 time continues to run. 
But is this always true? Does an insufficient complaint 
equal an inability to proceed to trial? 
In Camacho, the court discussed the difference between a 
latent defect and a facial defect in what would otherwise 
constitute a criminal court information.88  Citing to Matter of 
Edward B.,89 the Camacho court noted that where “the case had 
proceeded beyond the pretrial stages and had entered the fact-
finding stage, the need for (a facially sufficient) accusatory 
instrument . . . was no longer compelling . . . since the accused 
has already been brought before the court and the witnesses are 
available to describe the case against the accused, in person and 
under oath.”90 
Thus, a latent defect, such as the failure to provide a 
certificate of translation, is “dissipated” if such a defect is not 
noted until the time of trial.  “As the Legislature has foreseen 
the . . . purpose of the statute is amply served by facial 
compliance.”91 
If the defect in the People’s information is latent, the People 
 
87. See generally People v. Bolden, 578 N.Y.S.2d 914 (App. Term 1992). 
88. People v. Camacho, 711 N.Y.S.2d 283 (Crim. Ct. 2000). 
89. 606 N.E.2d 1353 (N.Y. 1992). 
90. Camacho, 711 N.Y.S.2d at 287 (citing In re Edward B., 606 N.E.2d 
1353, 1356 (N.Y. 1992)). 
91. Id. (emphasis in original) (citing In re Edward B., 606 N.E.2d at 1353); 
see People v. Antonovsky, 975 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Crim. Ct. 2011).  In Antonovsky, 
while complainant’s admission, that he had not read the complaint before 
signing a corroborating affidavit, means that the Complaint technically 
contained hearsay, his testimony during the People’s direct examination 
effectively corroborated the contents of the Complaint.  Id. at 327. 
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may proceed to trial with a facially insufficient charging 
instrument.  If the defect is discovered during the pre-trial stage, 
it is considered facial. 
When the defect is discovered pre-trial, should all time be 
charged to the People up to the date of discovery of the defect? 
In general, the answer is “no.”  In People v. Odoms,92 the court 
held that “replacement of one accusatory instrument which is 
defective by another involving the same crime does not affect 
time computations . . . the fact that a superceding [sic] 
instrument is filed does not automatically render the entire 
period prior thereto as includable.”93 
In particular, the court in Odoms was concerned that a 
defendant could “silently lie in wait, while CPL Sec. 30.30 time 
expires, to raise an objection to the facial insufficiency of an 
information that was apparent at all times and then ask the 
court to charge the People ab initio.”94  Under these 
circumstances, the Odoms court deemed that “Defendant made 
an informed decision expressly waiving her speedy trial 
rights.”95 
In Camacho, the court did not have the same “bad faith” 
concerns.  Nonetheless, Camacho also did not express a belief in 
retroactively charging the time to the People for a facially 
insufficient information.  Instead, “the People should be allowed 
a reasonable period of time, to be determined by the court 
depending upon the particular factual circumstances of the case, 
to [cure the defect]. Any period of time beyond such reasonable 
period is chargeable to the People pursuant to CPL [section] 
30.30.”96 
If Odoms expressed the worst case scenario, and effectively 
sanctioned the defense for “lying in wait” to assert a facial defect, 
in the hopes of gaining a dismissal under 30.30, Camacho 
provides a discretionary method to address a facial defect 
discovered pre-trial.  Here, the Court can give the People a 
 
92. 541 N.Y.S.2d 720 (Crim. Ct. 1989). 
93. Id. at 720-21; see also People v. Diaz, 2014 WL 837070, at *3 (N.Y. 
Crim. Ct. Mar. 3, 2014); People v. Schiavone, 971 N.Y.S.2d 431, 435 (Crim. Ct. 
2013).  
94. Odoms, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 722. 
95. Id. at 721; see People v. Wilson, 899 N.Y.S.2d 582 (Crim. Ct. 2010). 
96. People v. Camacho, 711 N.Y.S.2d 283, 288 (Crim. Ct. 2000). 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/5
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“reasonable” amount of time to cure the defect, and not charge 
the time to the People under CPL section 30.30.  Were the People 
to take an unreasonable amount of time to make the correction, 
the Court reserves the right to charge the People with the 
excessive delay.97 
 
IX. Conclusions 
 
As in so many areas of legal analysis, the issues addressed 
here are often fact sensitive.  There are very few, if any, bright 
line rules.  The careful prosecutor will insure that she has the 
witnesses available, and all proof necessary in hand (or at least, 
in existence) at the time they state ready.  The diligent defense 
attorney will seek dismissal of all allegations they believe to be 
insufficient, having fully reviewed the information prior to trial. 
But in the end, it is up to the Court, using its discretion, to 
determine when the People are, in fact, ready, and when the 
complaint is insufficient. 
The important principle to remember is that the limitations 
of CPL section 30.30 are not to be read synonymously with the 
requirements for conversion and facial sufficiency.  These are 
two intersecting, yet distinct areas of law which do not 
necessarily follow one after the other.  The careful practitioner 
must learn to distinguish between the two, and apply each as 
necessary. 
 
 
97. See generally People v. Gregg, 943 N.Y.S.2d 793 (Crim. Ct. 2011) 
("Here, the People had the ability to correct the defect, and at Defendant’s 
arraignment, the Court instructed the People to cure this error by ‘filing a 
superceding [sic] information’ . . . . [I]t is incomprehensible that the People 
should continue to ignore the Court’s instructions.").  
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